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Abstract
For over one hundred years, the definition of the term "terrorism" has been subjected to political propaganda.
In addition, dubious self-righteous indignation or outrage, often expressed by various states or prominent
politicians at the occurrence of acts of terror have often masked the participation of those same states in
international terrorism. In this endless cycle of finger pointing, accusations, denials, and counter-accusations,
the problematic of what constitutes terror in legal parlance has degenerated into an exercise in name-calling.
This sad spectacle frustrates objective and sincere attempts at fashioning out legal and policy framework to
deal with the scourge of terrorism. In this paper, I evaluate contemporary attempts at international law to deal
with the problem of terrorism. In my analysis, I conclude that unless powerful states eschew their hypocritical
support of terror and also seek to understand why weak entities and marginalized groups resort to "terrorism,"
the current outbreak of "wars on terrorism" is an exercise in futility.
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For over one hundred years, the definition of the
term "terrorism" has been subjected to political
propaganda. In addition, dubious self-righteous
indignation or outrage, often expressed by various states
or prominent politicians at the occurrence of acts of
terror have often masked the participation of those same
states in international terrorism.
In this endless cycle of finger pointing, accusations,
denials, and counter-accusations, the problematic ofwhat
constitutes terror in legal parlance has degenerated into
an exercise in name-calling. This sad spectacle frustrates
objective and sincere attempts at fashioning out legal and
policy framework to deal with the scourge of terrorism.
In this paper, I evaluate contemporary attempts at
international law to deal with the problem of terrorism. In
my analysis, I conclude that unless powerful states eschew
their hypocritical support of terror and also seek to
understand why weak entities and marginalized groups
resort to "terrorism," the current outbreak of "wars on
terrorism" is an exercise in futility.
Pendant plus de cent ans, la d6finition du terme ,
terrorisme - a dt6 soumise A la propagande politique. De
plus, l'indignation ou la reprobation bien-pensante et
douteuse, qu'expriment souvent divers ttats ou politiciens
dominants lorsque surviennent des actes de terrorisme, a
souvent masqu6 la participation de ces m~mes ttats au
terrorisme international.
Dans cette spirale interminable d'incriminations,
d'accusations, de d6mentis et de contre-attaques, la
question de savoir ce qui constitue du terrorisme en
langagejuridique a d6g~n6r6 pour se transformer en une
foire aux injures. Ce triste spectacle lse les tentatives
objectives et sinccres de modeler notre cadre juridique et
de politiques pour s'attaquer au f16au du terrorisme.
Dans cet article, j'6value les tentatives
contemporaines que fait le droit international pour
affronter le problme du terrorisme.Dans mon analyse,
fen arrive A conclure que, si que les Etats puissants ne
s'abstiennent pas d'appuyer hypocritement le terrorisme
et, par ailleurs, ne cherchent pas A comprendre pour
quelles raisons les entit6s faibles et les groupes marginaux
recourent au . terrorisme ,,, le d6clenchement actuel de
, guerres contre le terrorisme , constituera une entreprise
futile.
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Few issues in our times have produced as much heated rhetoric as
terrorism. Ironically, while terrorism has become a familiar word, its
meaning is among the least understood. While it would be tolerable if the
ideological or propagandistic use of the word "terrorism" were solely a
pastime of ordinary people doing ordinary things, it is intolerable that top
policymakers entrusted with the duty of securing the populace are unwilling
to engage in serious thinking about this concept. An apparent consequence
of the propagandistic use of terrorism is the displacement of rational
discourse on the concept and juridical meaning of terrorism.1 How can the
"war on terror" be successful in achieving its objectives if we understand
neither the core elements of what constitutes terrorism nor its legal
character?
In this article, I argue that the war on terror, as presently pursued,
is a reproach to both international law and domestic constitutional
governance. The word terrorism has become a populist domestic political
strategy. In my argument, I posit that by refusing to have an intelligent and
rational understanding of what terrorism is and what we seek to achieve
through its elimination, international law reinforces its reputation as a
discipline of crisis. 2 Further, I argue that international law is biased in its
construction and resolution of global issues. There is a strong tendency for
powerful states and vested interest groups to use the substance and forum
of international law to protect their narrow self-interests, which threatens
the legitimacy, coherence, and fairness of the global legal order.
The war on terror, I argue, demonstrates how international law
facilitates the metamorphosis of first-world interest and convenience from
discourse into juridical fact, simultaneously banishing third-world issues to
the periphery. Thus, it is an abiding feature of the structure and process of
international law that when powerful states experience fears, concerns, and
inconveniences that weaker states and marginalized groups are forced to
I Julie Merton, "Terrorism as Ideology: Implications for Intervention" (1999) 93 Am. Soc. Int'l
L. Rev. 78 at 78-79.
2 Hilary Charlesworth, "International Law: A Discipline of Crisis" (2002) 65 Mod. L. Rev. 377.
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accept as "normal," the institutions, norms, and processes of international
law are quickly deployed to assist these states and vested interest groups.
Powerful states create and remake juridical reality by reconfiguring legal
narratives.
Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September
2001 ("9/11"), common refrains from the Bush administration include
"September 11 changed the world" and in turn "we (the United States)
have changed the World." This mindset and narrative constructs the United
States as a saintly victim of global terrorism. Of course, the United States
was a victim of terrorism on 9/11, but the mainstream narrative on
terrorism pretends that prior to 9/11, or even afterwards, the United States
has not engaged in the practice of terror. Such a narrative contradicts well-
documented facts and perpetuates the fiction that the United States itself
has not been a supporter, instigator, and facilitator of state-sponsored
terrorism, particularly in the Cold War era.3 Indeed, even amidst the heated
rhetoric on terrorism and terrorists who seek to acquire weapons of mass
destruction from Saddam Hussein, very few scholars and policymakers have
deemed it fit to remind all that the United States and other Western states
were instrumental in building the intricate arsenal of the "weapons of mass
destruction" possessed and deployed by the defunct regime of Saddam
Hussein.4
In short, the legal historiography of terrorism and the roles that
states play in promoting terror have largely become a nauseating exercise
of delusion, self-induced amnesia, and the denial of self-evident truths. On
a normative scale, it is a narrative that threatens the global consensus that
terrorism, regardless of its source, is unacceptable. The ideological
posturing, tough talk, and intellectual laziness inherent in a propagandistic
use of terrorism make it difficult to separate reality from rhetoric. This
narrative has the potential to make the war on terrorism permanent, with
no parameters for assessing victory and measuring costs.5 Indeed, as
presently conceived and prosecuted, the war on terror is no real war; there
are no fixed enemies and no boundaries of conflict. It is a politically
3Christopher H. Pyle, "Defining Terrorism" (1986) 64 Foreign Policy 63.
4 Disease-producing organisms and poisonous materials were exported from the United States to
Iraq under U.S. government license between 1985-1988. The pathogens included botulinum toxin and
anthrax. Over seventy shipments of bacillus anthracis from the United States were made to Iraq in three
years. These micro-organisms were identical to those the United Nations inspectors found and
recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program. See Ikechi Mgbeoji, "Prophylactic Use of Force:
The Illegitimacy of Canada's Participation in 'Coalitions of the Willing' Without United Nations
Authorization and Parliamentary Sanction" (2003) 8:2 Rev. Const. Stud. 169.
5W. Wesley Pue, "The War on Terror: Constitutional Governance in a State of Permanent
Warfare" (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L. J. 267.
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expedient slogan without substance. Its main purpose is to scare the
populace into uncritical and unquestioning faith in the government. Its
recurring message is one of fear and more fear. It neither enlightens us
about terror nor offers any coherent and defensible process for dealing with
it.
This article examines, from a third-world perspective,6 how
international law has lent its formidable weight and faltering legitimacy to
a famished narrative and discourse that ignores the role of various
governments of the United States in lending material and moral support to
global terrorists across the globe. While many commentators rightly
condemn the perversion of Islam by Al-Qaeda and like-minded desperate
groups, it must be remembered that for many decades various U.S.
governments have sabotaged and undermined the governments of its
perceived ideological opponents by supporting various "rebel" movements
whose activities are legally and morally within the same orbit as those of Al-
Qaeda.7
I argue that if the struggle against global terrorism is to succeed,
international law must be coherent and even-handed in its
conceptualization of terrorism. This article is divided into four parts. Part
I briefly introduces the subject of terrorism, critiques the definitional crisis
that has afflicted it, and explores the impact of that definitional crisis on the
legal regulation of terror in international law. Part II examines how the
structure and process of international law has, since 1945, treated Western
terrorism against the Third World as a non-issue or, at best, as a side story.
Terrorism, so constructed under the mainstream narrative, was until 9/11
a problem of "other" peoples existing outside the "civilized" moral, spatial,
and ideological orbits of the United States and the remainder of the West.
As the feeling grew that terrorism was a peculiar problem of the
"uncivilized" peoples of the Third World, the gap in threat perception
became increasingly wider and international law was ill-prepared to deal
with the causes, nature, and ramifications of terrorism on a global level.8
More importantly, Part II will question and critique the assumption that the
6 For a brief but rich insight on the Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL) see
Makau Mutua, "What is TWAIL?" (2000) 94 Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proc. 31; Anthony Anghie, "What is
TWAIL: Comment" (2000) 94 Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proc. 39.
7Formed in the late 1980s by Osama bin Laden, AI-Qaeda, meaning "The Foundation," was
intended to serve as a foundation upon which to build a global Islamic army. See U.S., National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement (No. 15) at 2. For a brief
account of U.S. support for terrorist groups see Kenneth Sharpe, "The Real Cause of Irangate" (1987)
68 Foreign Policy 19.
8 Benjamin Fordham, "The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political
Economy Model for U.S. Uses of Force" (1998) 42:3 Int'l Stud. Q. 567 at 567, 584.
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major practitioners of terrorism are people from the Third World. 9 To the
contrary, powerful states, especially the United States, are some of the
leading proponents of terrorism.1°
Part III considers the West's response to 9/11 and examines some
of the implications of the West's response to that event with respect to
international law and global security. Part IV concludes with a prognosis of
the emerging global regime that governs terrorism and concludes the
analysis arguing that the narrative on global terrorism, since the events of
9/11, has been conditioned to assuage the wounded feelings of the United
States at an enormous cost to international law and international human
rights law.
I. TERRORISM AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF FEAR
What is terrorism?" The word terrorism is European in origin and
has been in use for just over two hundred years, stemming from the regime
de la terreur in revolutionary France in the late eighteenth century.
However, its philosophy and objectives are probably universal and have
existed for several millennia. Sun Tzu, the famous Chinese tactician and
philosopher, summarized the goal of terrorism when he wrote: "Kill
one-frighten ten thousand."12 Neither Osama bin Laden, nor Hamas, nor
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon invented terrorism. Although they have all
practised terrorism across international borders, the international
dimensions of terrorism were identified prior to World War 1I.'3
Although most states in the pre-World War II era had notions of
what they thought constituted terrorism, crafting a generally acceptable
definition of terrorism in international law proved extremely difficult. For
example, the 1937 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism," adopted by the League of Nations, was only ratified by a single
country. The issue of a generally accepted definition of terrorism surfaced
again in the 1950s when a rash of incidents endangering civil aircraft
became the vogue for desperate groups and individuals based in Palestine.
9 Zachary Karabell, "Fundamental Misconceptions: Islamic Foreign Policy" (1997) 105 Foreign
Policy 76; Ghassan Salame, "Islam and the West" (1993) 90 Foreign Policy 144.
10 Charles Maechling, Jr., "Washington's Illegal Invasion" (1990) 79 Foreign Policy 113.
11 Louis Rene Beres, "Meaning of Terrorism: Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications"
(1995) 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 239.
12 Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable World (New York: Routledge, 1994) at 3.
13 Ilias Bantekas, "The International Law of Terrorist Financing" (2003) 97 A.J.I.L. 315 at 315.
1416 November 1937, Doc. C.546.M.383.1937.V, 19 League of Nations Official Journal 23 (1938).
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Three conventions, namely, the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,15 the 1970 Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure ofAircraft (Hijacking), 16
and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of CivilAviation (Sabotage),17 marked the dominance of
a thematic and ad hoc treatment of aspects of what states considered to be
terrorism in international law. Thus, rather than deal with a generic concept
of terrorism, international law began a case-by-case approach to the
manifestations of terrorism. As such, there are numerous treaties and
conventions on kidnappings, protection of nuclear materials, bombing of
civilians, killing of diplomats, the financing of terrorism, hostage taking, et
cetera, rather than a single treaty or convention with a generic definition of
terrorism. 8
Most of the treaties reflected international law's preoccupation
with the fears of the West. For example, the 1963 Tokyo Convention and the
1970 Hague Convention were direct global responses to air piracy by the
Palestinians. Similarly, the 1979 United Nations agreement19 was a direct
response to Palestinian terrorist activities. By contrast, no similar global
response was developed with respect to acts of terror perpetrated by
Western regimes and their client states in the Third World.20 Thus, while
international law seemed to grapple with terrorism that affected the
interests of the West, it closed its eyes to various acts of terrorism
committed by proxies of the superpowers and their allies in their
gladiatorial struggle for ideological and geopolitical dominance in the Third
World. In the European continent, the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism21 and the Dublin Agreement22 were developed in
response to the terrorist activities of the Baader-Meinhof group in the
14 September 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, 20 U.S.T. 2941.
16 16 December 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, 22 U.S.T. 1641.
17 23 September 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177,24 U.S.T. 564.
18 Thomas M. Franck & Bert B. Lockwood Jr., "Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International
Convention on Terrorism" (1974) 68 Am. J. Int'l L. 69.
19 International Convention Against the Taking ofHostages, 18 December 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
20 Susanne Jonas, "Dangerous Liaisons: The U.S. in Guatemala" 103 Foreign Policy 144; Brian
K. Landsberg, "United States in Vietnam: A Case Study in the Law of Intervention" (1962) 50 Cal. L.
Rev. 515; Ole R. Holsti, "The Three-Headed Eagle: The United States and System Change" (1979) 23:3
Int'l Stud. Q. 339.
21 27 January 1977, 15 l.L.M. 1272 (adopted by the Council of Europe 10 November 1976).
22
Agreement on the Application of the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, 4
December 1979, 19 I.L.M. 325.
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Federal Republic of Germany.
In regard to defining terrorism, there are about twenty-two
categories of international crimes of terrorism, representing over three
hundred international instruments enacted between 1815 and 1992. Yet,
none of the international instruments offer a generic definition. Ironically,
states strongly disagree on how to define the term and who should be
identified as a terrorist.2 3 It would seem that terrorism is whatever its
"hunter" thinks it is. Ten recent United Nations conventions and protocols
on various aspects of terrorism failed to offer a generic definition of
terrorism. Defining terrorism has remained a major hurdle to reaching
international consensus on how to deal with it. Only through a rigorous and
dispassionate examination of what constitutes terror can modern
international lawyers and international institutions escape the blinding
rhetoric and righteous nationalistic indignation which has historically made
their role in the struggle against terrorism difficult.
Although some scholars have dismissed the utility of a generic
definition of terrorism,24 it is submitted that the absence of a coherent,
universal concept of terrorism and a common structure for its eradication
has ultimately created a propagandistic narrative of terrorism. In the
absence of a generic definition, it is impossible to have the rudimentary
elements for establishing guilt in terrorism. Without capturing the social
and legal wrong that terrorism represents, the current rhetoric on terrorism
degenerates into name-calling,25 validating the aphorism that one person's
terrorist is another's freedom fighter.26
23 Roberta Smith, "America Tries to Come to Terms With Terrorism: The United States
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism Law and
International Response" (1997) 5 Cardozo J. Int'l. & Comp. L. 249.
24 John Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and Economic
Dimensions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989).
25 As Sornarajah has argued, "The example of Osama bin Laden and the August 1998 bombing
of Sudan by the United States show the inutility of the concept. If bin Laden is a terrorist, as indeed he
is, should not the same application be used to describe those who bombed a non-existent chemical
factory in Sudan?" Muthu-Cumuraswamy Sornarajah, "Terrorism not Useful for Analyzing Random
Violence" (1999) 93 Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proc. 79 at 79.
26 For example, the pre-state Zionist Movement carried out extensive terror against Arab civilians,
the British, and Jews. UN Mediator Folke Bernadotte, was murdered by Zionist terrorists. On the other
hand, former Prime Minister Menachem Begin and former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel
were all Zionist "terrorists" in the eyes of the British government in Palestine. In his article entitled
"Terror," written for Hazit, the journal run by Lehi, the terrorist organization to which he belonged,
Yitzhak Shamir declared that "[n]either Jewish morality nor Jewish tradition can be used to disallow
terror as a means of war ... . We are very far from any moral hesitations when concerned with the
national struggle. First and foremost, terror is for us part of the political war appropriate for the
circumstances of today ..... ".Furthermore, it is often said by some commentators that militant
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More importantly, the sanctions imposed against "terrorists" may
represent an exercise in inductive application of our prejudices and political
preferences. A person or entity becomes labeled and treated as a "terrorist"
simply because state officials have said they are. In such a paradigm, our
prejudices and biases against the "other" supplant a reasoned, consistent,
and qualitative assessment of acts that constitute terror regardless of the
perpetrator. Operating within this mindset, for example, Caleb Pilgram
defined terrorism as "membership in a clandestine or expatriate
organization aiming to coerce an established government by an act of
violence against it or its subjects., 27 This definition presupposes that states
do not engage in terrorism and that only individuals and foreigners
belonging to "clandestine" organizations practice terror. Both assumptions
are wrong.
It is therefore of utmost importance that international lawyers and
policymakers frontally deal with the concept of terrorism and come to grips
with its underlying concept. Anything short of that exposes the idea of
Palestinians who execute fellow Palestinians suspected of "collaborating" with Israel are terrorists. Yet,
[t]he archives of the Mainstream Zionist resistance group, Haganah, contain the names of
40 Jews killed by Menachem Begin's Irgun and Lehi. Yitzhak Shamir's personal assassination
of a Lehi associate is a famous incident. The official Irgun history, while recalling with
admiration many acts of terror against Arab civilians, also cites the murder of a Jewish
member who, it was feared, would give information to the police if captured. Suspected
collaborators were a particular target. The Haganah Special Actions Squads carried out
"punitive actions" against Jewish informers. A Haganah prison in Haifa contained a torture
chamber for interrogation of Jews suspected of collaboration with the British.
As cited in Noam Chomsky, "International Terrorism: Image and Reality" in Alexander George,
ed., Western State Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 1991) at 28 [Chomsky]. Similarly, those who
excoriated Yassir Arafat for not condemning Palestinian terrorism in a loud voice quickly forget that
Chaim Weizmann, first President of Israel and considered one of the saintly figures of the national
movement
did not think it morally decent to denounce either the acts [of Jewish terrorism] or their
perpetrators in public ... he did not propose to speak out against acts, criminal as he thought
them, which sprang from the tormented minds of men driven to desperation, and ready to
give up their lives to save their brothers from what, he and they were equally convinced, was
a betrayal and a destruction cynically prepared for them by the foreign offices of the western
powers.
Eric Marsden, "US Plans a 'Cordon"', Sunday Times (10 October 1982), cited in Chomsky at 28.
See also Jonathan Stevenson, "Northern Ireland: Treating Terrorists As Statesmen" (1997) 105 Foreign
Policy 125; Isaiah Berlin, Personal Impressions (New York: Viking Press, 1981) at 50; Lawrence Harke,
"The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 and American Freedoms: A Critical Review" (1989) 43 U. Miami L.
Rev. 667.
27 Caleb Pilgram, "Terrorism in National and International Law" (1990) 8 Dick. J. Int'l. L. 147.
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terrorism to excessive political manipulation and propaganda. As
Christopher Blakesley has rightly observed,
[t]o say that a conduct is punishable because it is proscribed, and that it is proscribed because
states agree that it is terrorism, obviously begs the analytical question. The problem with the
inductive approach by itself is that unless we distill the essential principles of the conduct that
has been condemned by international and domestic law to see what makes it terrorist, we
gain no conceptual insight and have no standards. We have a system like that of ancient
common law England, without principles, policy, coherence or conceptual integrity. Analysts
must discern principles behind the simple agreements or decisions. Otherwise, we agree that
international law is nothing more than the "will of the sovereign(s)," giving in to the tendency
evident among some political scientists and manifest in the rhetoric of the so-called war
against terrorism (or drugs). Law becomes nothing more than a propagandistic exercise, in
or by which the greatest power almost always wins?2
An acceptable definition in international law of what constitutes
terrorism is integral to the rule of law itself. It contradicts all known norms
of basic justice to punish an individual or a group of persons for vague,
undefined conduct. International law must determine the concrete actus
reus, mens rea, and proscribed social harm if it hopes to deal with terror in
a coherent, lawful, and consistent manner.29 An inductive approach fails to
deal with terrorism from a conceptual basis.
Another reason why the inductive approach to global terrorism
must be rejected is that it focuses on political violence directed against
industrialized states while ignoring the West's support of terrorism against
Third World peoples and governments.3" More importantly, this approach
fosters the erroneous impression that democracies do not partake in or
practise terrorism.31 Further, an absence of international consensus on what
constitutes terrorism facilitates the construction of terror as an established
mode of surrogate warfare or a legitimate mode of conflict. Given that
most acts of terrorism actually occur at the level of surrogate warfare,
international law would do well to achieve consensus on the concept of
terrorism.
28 Christopher Blakesley, Book Review of State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political,
and Economic Dimensions by John Murphy (1992) 86 A.J.I.L. 428 at 429-30.
29 C. Blakesley, Terrorism, Drugs, International Law and the Protection of Human Liberty
(Ardsley-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational, 1991).
30 For a current application of the thematic and inductive approach, see Geoffrey Levitt,
Democracies Against Terror: The Western Response to State-Supported Terrorism, (New York: Prager,
1988). For a contrary perspective, see Richard Falk, Revolutionaries and Functionaries: The Dual Face
of Terror, written under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University (New
York: Dutton, 1988).
31 Allison Taylor, "Another Front in the War on Terrorism? Problems With Recent Changes to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act" (2003) 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 533.
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At the domestic level, states have achieved relatively greater clarity
in articulating the core elements of terrorism. For example, the official
United States Code defines terrorism as:
[A]n activity that (A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State; and (B)
appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) affect the conduct of a
government by assassination or kidnapping.
32
Similarly, a U.S. Army manual on countering terrorism defines
terrorism as "the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain
goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature. This is done
through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear., 33 Executive Order No.
13224 issued by the Bush administration retains the same definition of
terrorism as the U.S. Code. It would seem that endangerment to life and
public safety for the purposes of advancing politics, religion, or ideology is
at the heart of domestic laws on terrorism. Given that ordinary acts of
picketing or public non-violent demonstrations could intimidate or coerce
a civilian population, it is debatable whether domestic laws on terrorism
are, in fact, an improvement on international inertia in defining terrorism.
It is generally understood that there are limited circumstances
under which the use of force is permitted in international relations.34
Indeed, violent measures undertaken by persons or entities fighting for
liberation or engaged in anti-colonial domination may be considered to be
terrorism. UN General Assembly Resolution 42/159 of 7 December 1987
clearly provides that:
Nothing in the present resolution could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination,
freedom and independence as derived from the Charter of the United Nations, of peoples
forcibly deprived of that right, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and
foreign occupation or other forms of colonial domination, nor the ... right of these peoples
to struggle to this end and to seek and receive support [in accordance with the Charter and
other principles of international law.]
35
32 U.S., United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 98th Cong. (West Publishing
Co., 1984) at vol. 2, para. 3077.
33 US Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction (TRADOC Pamphlet No. 525-37,
1984).
34 This is a problematic qualifier. In the cycle of violent interaction, it is often the case that each
side perceives its own acts as retaliation for the terrorism of the adversary. The cycle of violence in the
Israel/Palestinian conflict is the classic example.
35 Interestingly, while this provision was passed with near-unanimous approval by all states, only
the United States, Israel, and South Africa opposed. Honduras abstained.
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We are thus left with numerous and specific legislation by states on
what constitutes terrorism. Whether this patchwork of domestic laws
grounds global consensus on what constitutes an act of terrorism at the
international level is highly questionable. Assuming but not conceding that
it does, such a backdoor approach engenders what Noam Chomsky has
aptly described as the two paradigms of terrorism. The first is what he
refers to as the "propagandist" narrative and the other is the "literal"
narrative.
While the former construes terrorism "as a weapon to be exploited
in the service of some system of power," the latter takes terrorism as a
serious issue to be rigorously studied and properly understood.36 Within the
propagandist narrative, the illicit use of force is considered legitimate and
a species of military war. This narrative locates terrorism, especially when
practised by states, as a form of strategic deterrence. Thus, states may
engage in terrorism without recognizing it as such or being held legally
liable if the objectives are to neutralize perceived ideological, political, and
geo-political opponents. It is for this reason that acts committed or
orchestrated by some powerful states that qualitatively constitute terrorism
are generally not construed as being terroristic by definition as long as such
acts fall within a state's perceived strategic domain. In this paradigm,
powerful states such as the United States are permitted to engage in
terrorism while marginal entities like Hamas get portrayed in the media as
terrorists.
This attitudinal bias in the evaluation of what constitutes terrorism
is practically a convention and lies at the root of the West's denial of the
manifold consequences of state terrorism perpetrated by powerful states
like the United States. As Michael Stohl observes, "[w]e must recognize
that by convention-and it must be emphasized only by convention-great
power use and the threat of the use of force is normally described as
coercive diplomacy and not as a form of terrorism."37
In effect, acts which qualitatively fall within the ambit of most
domestic legal definitions of terrorism, when performed or orchestrated by
great powers, are more likely to be euphemistically described as "coercive
diplomacy" or "low intensity warfare." On the other hand, when similar
activities are performed or orchestrated by Al-Qaeda or Hamas or the
Islamic Jihad, a swift denunciation of such terrorist acts follow. If
international law must be a credible tool in the war against terror, it must
36 Chomsky, supra note 26 at 12.
37 Michael Stohl, "States, Terrorism and State Terrorism" in Robert 0. Slater & Michael Stohl,
Current Perspectives on International Terrorism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988) 155 at 171 as cited
in Chomsky, supra note 26 at 12.
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eschew the propagandist approach, which has plagued even scholarly
treatments of the issue in the post-9/11 era.38
Terrorism became a global issue of discourse in the 1.980s. The
Reagan administration, as Noam Chomsky observes, "took office
announcing its dedication to stamping out what the president called 'the
evil scourge of terrorism,' a plague spread by depraved opponents of
civilization itself., 39 It was not a coincidence that at the height of the Cold
War, the generally accepted narrative in the West attributed responsibility
for international terrorism to a "Soviet-based worldwide terror network
aimed at the destabilization of Western democratic society." 4 By the mid-
1980s, concern over international terrorism reached the level of virtual
frenzy. As Chomsky recalls, Middle Eastern/Mediterranean terrorism was
selected by editors as the lead story of 1985 in an AP poll and a year later,
the tourism industry in Europe was badly hit as Americans stayed away in
fear of Arab terrorists infesting European cities.41
In virtually the same apocalyptic language, Islamic "terrorists" have
replaced communist "terrorists" as the villains and enemies of "our
civilization." Yet, it is undeniable that various Western states have at one
time or another perpetrated or supported the perpetration of acts that are
qualitatively terroristic. In spite of that, the list of states involved in
terrorism is a rerun of the usual suspects: Libya,4" Sudan,43 Syria, the
defunct Soviet Union, Iraq, and Iran. The shrill rehash of this list by the
Western media and lazy academics perpetuates the myth that the only
terrorists in business are those who commit atrocities against western
governments and their allies.44 While much has been said and continues to
3 8 See e.g. Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in fact andpropaganda (Boston:
South End Press, 1982); Edward S. Herman & Frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian
Connection (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1986); Noam Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors:
International Terrorism in the Real World (New York: Claremont Research and Publications, 1986);
Walter Laquer, "The Age of Terrorism" in Noam Chomsky, ed., Necessary Illusions: Thought Control
in Democratic Societies (Montreal : CBC Enterprises, 1989).
39 Chomsky, supra note 26 at 13.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.42
42 For example, the Lockerbie bombing. See Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, SC Res. 748, UN SCOR,
1992.
43 In 1996, the UN Security Council called on the Sudanese government to desist from supporting
or assisting those terrorists that had attempted to assassinate the Egyptian president while he was in
Ethiopia.
44 Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., "The Use of Armed Force Against Terrorism: American Hegemony
or Impotence?" (2000) 1 Chicago J. Int'l L. 37.
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be said about some of the aforementioned states "nothing is said about the
ways in which the West has directly and indirectly supported state terrorism
in client states.,
45
II. THE NORTH-SOUTH (DIS)ENGAGEMENT WITH STATE-
SPONSORED TERRORISM
The dominant narrative on international terrorism has largely
focused on who allegedly is an international terrorist rather than a
qualitative assessment of what acts constitute terrorism. The major problem
with an identity-focused assessment of terrorism is that it has a tendency of
excusing or ignoring western terrorism while excoriating and condemning
acts of terror by less privileged persons or entities. In this paradigm,
marginal but well publicized terrorists assume global significance far
beyond the actual human suffering and property damage they cause. More
importantly, the dominant narrative on terrorism fosters the erroneous
impression that international terrorism is an invention of Islamic extremist
groups. Indeed, the signal characteristic of 9/11 and its global ramifications
is that it was plotted and executed by Islamic extremists. In other words, it
was not "the ocean of rubble cascading from the heavens, 46 nor the bright,
spirited people killed that marked out the sad events of that day. The
crucial factor was not the quality of the acts of terror, but the persons or
actors behind the tragedy.
Contrary to popular perceptions, the terrorist attacks against the
United States on U.S. soil did not start with Osama bin Laden or any of the
extreme Islamic groups. Terrorism is hardly a new issue for U.S.
policymakers In the late 1960s for example, student movements and
protests in the United States against the Vietnam War often degenerated
into acts that qualitatively fell within the definition of terrorism under
pertinent U.S. laws.48 Similarly, on 19 April 1995, an American terrorist
45 Kevin Ryan, Book Review of Terrorism and Political Violence: Limits & Possibilities of Legal
Control by Henry Han, ed. (1994) 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 201 at 202.
46 Supra note 5 at 268.
47 See generally L. Donohue, "In the Name of National Security: US Counterterrorist Measures,
1960-2000" (2001) 13:3 Terrorism and Political Violence 15.
48 Their activities were largely dealt with as domestic "subversive activity." The FBI developed
over a million files on the protesting students engaged in covert actions against some of the other
students. But the public condemnation was unequivocal. In fact, the U.S. Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with Regard to Intelligence, chaired by Senator Frank Church, found
that the U.S. government had overstepped their authority and threatened Americans' civil liberties in
its treatment of the subversive elements. For a detailed account see Donna M. Schlagheck, International
Terrorism: An Introduction to the Concepts and Actors (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1988) at 97.
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bombed the Oklahoma City Federal Building killing 168 people, including
small children and infants. As a result, on 17 April 1996, the U.S. Congress
passed an anti-terrorism bill.49 In addition, the House of Representatives
proposed two anti-militia bills, the Domestic Insurgency Act of 1995,5o and
the Domestic Counter Terrorism Act of 1995.5" Similarly, even religious
terrorism is also not the sole preserve of "Islamic extremists.""2 David
Koresh, leader of the Branch Davidians, a Christian sect, orchestrated acts
of Christian terrorism in Waco, Texas.53 Neither is racist-inspired terrorism
the sole preserve of Muslim fanatics.54 The important point here is that
although the responses made by the United States to the Oklahoma and
other domestic terrorist incidents were sweeping, they all pale into
insignificance beside the response to 9/11. More worrisome is the inherent
tendency of an identity-based approach to terrorism to treat state-
sponsored terror by the West as a form of clandestine warfare55 while
excoriating extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda.
For example, during the Soviet invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan, the United States supported, funded, and armed the
49 U.S., Bill H.R. 2703, Effective Death Penalty and Public Safety Act, 104th Cong., 1996.
50 U.S., Bill H.R. 1544, Domestic Insurgency Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1995.
51U.S., Bill H.R. 1899, Domestic Counter Terrorism Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1995.
52 The question has been raised whether the current struggle is against terrorism or Islamic
insurgency. A book authored by a senior Central Intelligence Agency officer argues that "we are
fighting a worldwide Islamic insurgency-not criminality or terrorism-and our policy and procedures
have failed to make more than a dent in enemy forces." See Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West
is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2004). See also Anonymous, Through Our
Enemies'Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future ofAmerica (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's,
2002). For an enlightening narrative of the internal discord in Islamic theology and the struggle for the
soul of Islam, see Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud From Tradition to
Terror (New York: Doubleday, 2002).
53On 28 February 1993, in Waco, Texas, over one hundred agents of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) unsuccessfully raided a religious compound in search of an illegal
stockpile of firearms and explosives. The compound was occupied by the Branch Davidians, a religious
sect led by David Koresh. The raid failed when the Davidians opened fire on the ATF agents. Six sect
members and four agents were killed, and sixteen people were wounded. The botched raid led to a fifty-
one day standoff that ended on 19 April 1993, when the FBI led a tank and gas assault on the
compound. Koresh and more than eighty Davidians died in the inferno. Robert McCurry, "Waco, Texas:
Where A Part of America's Heart and Sould Died", online: <http://www.islandone.org/
Politics/Waco.McCurry.html>.
54 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The appellant, a Ku Klux Klan leader, was convicted
under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism for advocating racial violence.
55Robert Rhodes, "On Clandestine Warfare" (1982) 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 333.
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mujahedin guerrillas.56 Osama bin Laden was a mujahedin in the Afghan
conflict. While he did the bidding of the U.S. government, he was, like
other members of the mujahedin, valourized as a "freedom fighter."57 In
the stagecraft that surrounded the funeral of late President Ronald Reagan,
it was very easy to forget the heinous activities against Third World states
and peoples perpetrated by U.S. client states and U.S. proxy armies during
the Reagan years. During the Cold War, President Reagan provided
extremist and terrorist groups with funds and equipment to destabilize
various states and regimes ideologically opposed to the United States. The
dissidents in Poland, for example, working in solidarity, transformed the
Warsaw Pact from an asset into a liability for the Soviets.
Further examples of American complicity in acts that qualitatively
pass for terrorism under U.S. laws abound. In the Americas,
notwithstanding various treaties and declarations outlawing the subversion
of one state by another, the United States variously sponsored, armed, and
encouraged rebel groups engaged in terrorist activities against their
governments and peoples. For example, the Declaration of Lima by the
Eighth International Conference of American States, 24 December 1938
declares that:
[I]n case the peace, security, or territorial integrity of any American republic is thus
threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern
and their determination to make effective their solidarity, coordinating their respective
sovereign wills by means of the procedure of consultation, established by the conventions in
force and by declarations of the inter-American conferences, using the measures which in
each case the circumstances may make advisable. It is understood that the Governments of
the American Republics will act independently in their individual capacity, recognizing fully
their juridical equality as sovereign states. 58
Notwithstanding this declaration, U.S. governments, on the
ideological crusade to export freedom, democracy, and free market
economy have often justified various acts of terrorism against opposing
56 M. Hasan Kakar, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
5 7
"Profile: Osama bin Laden", online: Foreign Policy Association
<http://www.fpa.org/newsletterinfo2478/newsletter info sub list.htm?section = Profile%3AOsama
%20bin%20Laden>. "Osama bin Laden", online: Encyclopaedia of the Orient
<http://lexicorient.com/e.o/osama_b_laden.htm>.
58 Reproduced in U.S., State Department, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943) at 440. See also, Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With
the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625(XXV), UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, UN Doc.
A/8082 (1970) 121.
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states and peoples.59 As Stohl has rightly observed, "in terms of terrorist
coercive diplomacy the USA has been far more active in the Third World
than has the (defunct) Soviet Union."6 Writing in the same vein, Ruth
Sivard's studies conclude that since World War 11, 95 per cent of all military
conflicts have occurred in the Third World and of that number, 79 per cent
have involved Western powers engaged in one form of "coercive military
diplomacy" or another.6' Although Iran, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, et cetera,
are surely terrorist states, the United States is unparalleled in its
commitment to state-sponsored international terrorism (euphemistically
described as "coercive military diplomacy") as a strategic instrument.
During the Reagan administration, for example, the United States not only
constructed semi-private international terrorist networks, it also employed
an array of mercenary states and clients-Taiwan, South Korea, Israel,
Saudi Arabia and others-to finance and implement its terrorist
operations, especially in Latin America 62 and the Middle East. Yet, it is
virtually anathema to most scholars, save for scholars such as Chomsky,
Falk, and Blakesley, to lump the United States with Libya, Iran, Sudan, and
the other usual suspects in the narrative on terrorism.
Interestingly, save for the celebrated litigation at the International
Court of Justice between Nicaragua and the United States, 63 U.S. support
of international terrorism against third world countries is rarely subjected
to judicial scrutiny or analysis. In the events leading up to that case, U.S.
proxy forces attacked Nicaragua, hitting the so-called "soft targets" (a
euphemism for barely defended civilian targets), especially agricultural
cooperatives. 6' Even liberals often defended these atrocities as sensible
policy provided that, in their views, there was a prospect that "democracy
[would] emerge at the other end., 61 In October 1986, a Contra supply plane
was shot down with an American mercenary on board.
The Nicaragua-U.S. hearings ensued and after the hearings it was
59Anthony D'Amato, "The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny" (1990) 84
A.J.I.L. 516.
60 Stohl, supra note 37, as cited in Chomsky supra note 26 at 35.
61 Ruth Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1981 (Leesburg, Va.: World Priorities,
1981).
62 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), Merits, 1986
I.C.J. Rep.14 [Nicaragua case].63 1d63Ibid.
64For an apologia of the U.S. position see John Moore, "The Secret War in Central America and
the Future of World Order" (1986) 80 A.J.I.L. 43.
65 Michael Kinsley, as cited in Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism (Boston: South End,
1988) at 78.
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66clear that the United States was deep into its commitment to terrorism.
The United States, recalls Richard Falk, "signaled its bitter opposition in
advance to any recourse to judicial procedures, refused to appear during
the merits phase of the proceedings, and scornfully repudiated the authority
of the Court to pronounce upon the issues in controversy., 67 Nevertheless,
by an overwhelming majority, the judges of the International Court of
Justice found that the United States trained, financed, and supported the
Contra terrorists. 68 Although the judgment fell short of attributing the
violations of international humanitarian law to the U.S. government, it was
clear that acts of terrorism perpetrated by the Contras were a natural and
logical result of U.S. support and finance.
Interestingly, after the International Court of Justice handed down
its decision in June 1986 condemning the United States for the unlawful use
of force in Nicaragua and other acts that qualitatively constitute terrorism, 69
the United States dismissed the court's decision as an irrelevant
pronouncement by a hostile forum. Scoffing at international law, the
United States proceeded to veto a Security Council resolution calling on all
states to observe international law. It has never been disputed by the
United States that its commitment to the Contras was motivated by
ideological and political aims.7" Clearly, the Contra war involved numerous
acts of violence designed to effect a policy change by a government. It was
a classic case of state-sponsored terrorism. At a normative level, the
Nicaragua case emphatically rejected the imperial attitude to terrorism, a
narrative that characterizes state-sponsored terrorism by powerful states as
"defensive" or "strategic" measures while reserving its venom and
condemnation for similar actions by extremist groups such as Hamas. State-
sponsored terrorism is not exempt from legal accountability.
In addition to the infamous Contra wars in which the United States
66 Chomsky, supra note 26 at 7.
6 7 Supra note 30 at 2.
68 Supra note 62.
69 Richard Falk, "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits) (1987) 81
A.J.I.L. 106.
7 0 As top administration officials explained, the goal of the attack was to force the Sandinistas to
divert "scarce resources to the war and away from social programs and to provoke cross-border attacks
by Nicaraguan forces and thus serve to demonstrate Nicaragua's aggressive behaviour." Ibid. The U.S.
attitude to the Nicaragua case-a decision which has been described by knowledgeable legal scholars
as "exemplary in striking a balance between fairness to a sovereign state accused of serious violations
of international law and a diligent effort to interpret the relevant rules and principles in a constructive
manner"-undermines its current commitment to deal with the problem of global terrorism with
honesty and coherence. Ibid. at 106.
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directly trained and supported its proxy armies engaged in terrorist
activities, in a second category of cases it provided moral and material
support to its client states to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.
Under current U.S. laws, such acts would qualify as terrorism if perpetrated
by other states against U.S. interests. In El Salvador, thousands were raped,
murdered, and mutilated by the Salvadorean army with the connivance of
the U.S. government. Other mercenary states, including Guatemala
witnessed large-scale episodes of civilian deaths, intimidation, and
extermination perpetrated by the Guatemalan army with the full support
and connivance of the United States. Were Guatemala and El Salvador
engaged in similar activities today with Al-Qaeda or any other Islamic
terrorist entity, they would be prime candidates for membership in the
"Axis of Evil."
It would be factually incorrect to hold that President Reagan was
the first U.S. President to preside over large scale U.S. support of global
terror. Nor would it be tenable to hold that the political ideology of the
occupant of the White House makes any real difference to the notorious
support which various U.S. governments have offered terrorist
organizations fighting its proxy wars, especially during the Cold War. Both
Republican and Democratic U.S. governments have adopted the same
policy of supporting terrorist entities and sympathetic client states as long
as those entities and client states are thought to be doing the bidding of the
U.S. government.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States supported various entities
and client states that engaged in acts of terrorism. The two prime examples
remain the anti-Cuba groups and the U.S.-backed militias in Lebanon. On
anti-Cuban terrorism, it is worth noting that in 1961, the United States
established a special group under the code name "Mongoose," involving at
least four hundred Americans and two thousand Cubans. With an
estimated annual budget of 50 million U.S. dollars, this group was run in
part by a Miami CIA station. The activities of this group-bombing of hotels
and industrial installations, sinking of fishing boats, contamination of sugar
exports, et cetera, fell squarely within most definitions of terrorism.
Although the CIA itself did not specifically authorize all the various acts of
violence perpetrated by this group, there was little doubt that those
terrorist operations were done with the financial, moral, and infrastructural
support of the CIA during the Cuban missile crisis of October/November
1962.71 In fact, on November 8, a terrorist team dispatched from the United
States blew up a Cuban industrial facility, allegedly killing four hundred
71 For a detailed account of this and other incidents during the Cuban missile crisis see Raymond
Garthoff, Reflections of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987)
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workers.
These activities were undertaken when President Kennedy, a
Democrat, was in office. In addition to these terrorist acts, it is common
knowledge that various U.S. governments have tried at various times to
assassinate President Fidel Castro12-again, an act of terrorism. Similarly,
President Nixon, a Republican, presided over terrorist activities against
Cuba. Of course, it cannot be denied that Cuba has been accused of
perpetrating terrorist acts, but the point here is that the narrative on global
terrorism has been conducted in a manner that pretends that the United
States and other major powers are innocent victims of terrorism. It is a
fallacious narrative that creates the impression and indeed juridical reality,
that weak, "non-democratic," "communist," or "uncivilized" states and
peoples are the sole practitioners of international terrorism. Given their
long history of support for terrorist groups ostensibly committed to
democracy and free market economies, the United States and other major
powers are indeed the champions of terrorism.
On many occasions, the United States has launched terrorist attacks
or supported terrorist entities as long as the preferred ideology of the U.S.
government is being propagated. Save perhaps for Afghanistan, Nicaragua,
and presently, Iraq, no other state has suffered as much terrorism in the
hands of the United States as Cuba. In October 1976, CIA-trained Cuban
exiles bombed a Cuban civilian airliner, killing all seventy-three on board.
Neither this nor the Bay of Pigs fiasco has dampened the enthusiasm of the
United States to support terrorist entities and terrorist activities aimed at
changing the ideological direction of Cuba.
Cuba was not the sole victim of U.S. terrorism. Southern Lebanon
was once the epicentre of U.S.-sponsored terrorism.73 Terrorist entities
supported by the U.S. government killed thousands and drove away
hundreds of thousands. Members of the Shin Beth, the Israeli Secret Police,
terrorized the southern Lebanese with impunity. With U.S. approval, Syria
entered Lebanon in 1976 to orchestrate the massacre of thousands at the
Palestinian refugee camp of Tel AI-Zaater. While these atrocities went on,
the media spotlight was on the equally barbaric activities of members of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization. The terrorist activities of the United
States and Israel and their proxies received no serious scrutiny. Indeed, it
was only after 241 U.S. marines were blown up in the suicide bombing on
72 See ibid; Bradley Ayers, The War that Never Was:An Insider'sAccountof CIA Covert Operations
Against Cuba (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976); William Blum, The CIA: Forgotten History (London:
Zed Books, 1986).
73 Jerusalem Post (16 August 1981); Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: the United States, Israel
and the Palestinian, (Boston: South End, 1983) at 6-35.
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23 October 1983 that some scholars began to pay serious attention to the
war of attrition in southern Lebanon.
Further evidence of great power complicity in terrorism exists. In
1985, an Air India flight was blown up, killing 329 passengers on board. The
terrorists, as Noam Chomsky observes,
had been trained in paramilitary camp in Alabama run by Frank Camper, where mercenaries
were trained for terrorist acts in Central America and elsewhere. According to ex-
mercenaries, Camper had close ties to U.S. intelligence and was personally involved in the
Air India bombing, allegedly, a sting operation that got out of control. On a visit to India,
Attorney General Edwin Meese conceded in a backhanded way that the terrorist operations
originated in a U.S. terrorist training camp.74
Though the United States required that the Taliban hand over
Osama bin Laden, Frank Camper was not handed over to India. In March
1985, William Casey, the Director of the CIA, specifically authorized a car
bombing in Beirut killing eighty people and wounding 256.7" The target of
that terrorist attack was Sheikh Fadlallah, the Shi'ite leader accused by
Washington of complicity in "terrorism." One can also mention the U.S.
bombing of Tripoli in 1986 that was justified by unproven allegations of
Libyan complicity in the Berlin discotheque bombing.
Beyond the issue of U.S. foreign policy and its capacity to stir anti-
American feelings and thus catalyze the recruitment of potential terrorists
from the Muslim world, it must be stressed that the Muslim terrorist
apparatus, against which the West now wages a war, was in many respects
created by U.S. intelligence as a geopolitical weapon. It is this phenomenon
and its impact on 9/11 that the article addresses in the next section.
III. THE CHICKEN COMES HOME TO ROOST? AL-QAEDA
AND THE MORNING AFTER 9/11
The 9/11 plot has been traced to a veteran jihadist named Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed. A Kuwaiti from the Baluchistan region of Pakistan,
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed graduated from a U.S. college before honing his
skills in terrorism in the U.S.-sponsored anti-Soviet insurgency in
Afghanistan in the 1980s. 6 The Commission on the Terrorist Attacks
74 Chomsky, supra note 26 at 15; Leslie Cockburn, Out of Control (New York: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 1987) at 27.
75 Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CM, 1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1987) at 396.
76 U.S., National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement (No.
16) at 1.
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confirms that it was Mohammed who sold the idea of the 9/11 attacks to
Bin Laden. For an attack that cost "somewhere between $400,000 and
$500,000 to execute," its impact has been one of the most profound in
modern history.77 What has escaped more rigorous examination is the role
of the United States in training Mohammed, Bin Laden, and other
architects of the horrendous events of 9/11. A significant number of the Al-
Qaeda leadership are graduates of U.S.-trained insurgency movements.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser,
recently confirmed in an interview that President Carter gave billions of
dollars to the mujahedin in the 1970s, even before the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan. Arguably, the U.S. policy paid some dividends. It
induced the Soviets to invade Afghanistan. The subsequent debacle in
Afghanistan bled the Soviet Union to death and led to its ultimate
disintegration. Brzezinski and his prot6g6, Zalamy Khalilizad,78 set up a
corporation in the mid-1980s, funded by the U.S. Congress to train the
mujahedin to sell reporters the lie that the mujahedin were freedom
fighters and victims of aggression. 79 The hypocrisy should not escape
attention. While the United States denounced "Muslim extremism," they
knowingly fomented the emergence of an "Islamic insurgency" as a weapon
of policy against the Soviets. It was acceptable to the United States for the
mujahedin to "terrorize" the Soviet occupiers but it is not acceptable for
the mujahedin to terrorize American targets. The hypocrisy is staggering.
Such a hypocritical construction of terrorism brings international
law to ridicule and disrepute. How can international law be a vehicle or
instrument in the war against terror when its canons are inconsistently
applied in a brazenly cynical manner? If the U.S. foreign policy
establishment used Muslim extremism as a weapon once, is there any
guarantee, in principle, that the United States would not use it again? It is
remarkable that as long as the Afghan mujahedin, including Osama bin
Laden and other criminals who took part in the 9/11 plot, were implacably
opposed to the government in Kabul and fought the Soviet occupiers, they
were considered friends and allies of the United States. But as soon as they
77 Chomsky, supra note 30 at 11.
78 Interestingly, from May 2001 until 27 November 2003, Dr. Khalilzad was "Special Assistant to
the President and Senior Director for Gulf, Southwest Asia, and Other Regional Issues, National
Security Council." See "Statement by the Press Secretary on the Appointment of Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad"
(23 May 2001), online: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010523-7.html>. Note
that Southwest Asia covers the area from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia, including Iraq and Iran; it includes
most of the Middle East and extends to Georgia. On 27 November 2003, Dr. Khalilzad was appointed
Ambassador and Special Envoy to Afghanistan.
79 Joan Mower "Rebel Journalists to be Trained in Program; U.S. Will Aid Afghans in Telling
Their Story" The Los Angeles Times (27 October 1985) 1.
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opposed the United States with the same weapons they used against the
Soviets, they became terrorists.
Within this context, one questions the religious indignation which
the Bush administration has used to address the events of 9/11 and global
terrorism.80 In his address to the United Nations on 23 September 2003,
President Bush declared that:
[E]vents during the past two years have set before us the clearest of divides: between those
who seek order and those who spread chaos; between those who work for peaceful change
and those who adopt the methods of gangsters; between those who honour the rights of man
and those who deliberately take the lives of men and women and children without mercy or
shame. Between these alternatives there is no neutral ground. All governments that support
terror are complicit in a war against civilization.
81
It therefore seems that groups like A1-Qaeda are "retail"82
terrorists. The terrorism perpetrated by small and marginalized third-world
entities is often small-scale terrorism compared to that sponsored by the
West. Much of the terrorism discussed in the West is retail in stature.
Although the Bush administration has spent much of the past few years
waging a war against terrorism, a war that "will not end until every terrorist
group has been found, stopped, and defeated,, 83 it is increasingly becoming
evident that Washington has no real intention of liquidating all known
terrorist entities. That is, assuming the definition of terrorism encompasses
all forms of state-sponsored terrorism.
To the contrary, the White House is still arming a right-wing
paramilitary group in Colombia, the AUC, responsible for 70 per cent of
human rights abuses in Colombia. Many of Colombia's soldiers involved in
numerous massacres in Colombia were trained at the U.S. Army's
notorious School of the Americas (SOA) Watch in Benning, Georgia.
Human Rights Watch and other human rights activists have repeatedly
linked U.S.-trained Colombian army and paramilitary groups with
massacres in Colombia. Indeed, some of Latin America's most notorious
dictators are SOA graduates. The long list includes Manuel Noriega of
Panama, Leopoldo Galtieri and Roberto Viola of Argentina, and Hugo
80 Steven R. Ratner, "Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11" (2002) 96 Am. J. Int'l
L. 905.
81 "The Struggle For Iraq; In Bush's Words: 'Advance of Democratic Institutions in Iraq Is Setting
an Example"' The New York Times (24 September 2003) A12.
82 Chomsky, supra note 26 at 14.
83 George W. Bush, "President Declares Freedom at War With Fear" (20 September 2001), online:
< http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html >.
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Banzer Suarez of Bolivia.84 Were the SOA an Islamic school in the Middle
East, it is likely that it would have been obliterated by cruise missiles
launched from U.S. warships.
A more important observation is the relative indifference of
international law to U.S.-sponsored terrorism in contrast to its willingness
to act when international terrorists hurt U.S. interests. Thus, while the
international legal community folded its hands as the West engaged in its
acts of terror, it is significant that since 9/11, the United Nations framework
has been roused to take up the issue of terrorism. Upon signing Executive
Order 13224 85(Executive Order), President Bush stated specifically: "[I]f
you do business with the terrorists, if you support them, you will not do
business with the United States of America."86 Shortly thereafter, and as a
direct result of the Executive Order, the United Nations passed Resolution
1373.87 Worded more broadly than the Executive Order, the UN Resolution
dictates that all member states shall: (i) prevent and suppress the financing
of terrorist acts; (ii) criminalize the wilful provision or collection of funds
with the intention or knowledge that the funds should be used to carry out
terrorist acts; (iii) immediately freeze all economic resources of persons
who commit, or attempt to commit, acts of terrorism; and (iv) prohibit any
persons or entities within their territories from making any financial assets
or services available to terrorists.88
In addition, the UN Resolution requires all member states to refrain
from providing any form of support-including providing safe haven-to
entities or persons involved in terrorist acts and to ensure that any person
who participates in the financing, planning, preparation, or perpetration of
terrorist acts is brought to justice and administered a punishment that duly
reflects the gravity of such a crime. Member states also have an affirmative
duty to provide early warning of suspected terrorist activity through the
exchange of information.89 A careful review of Resolution 1373 and similar
international instruments fashioned in the aftermath of 9/11 clearly shows
84 Garry Leech, "Protesting U.S.-Sponsored Terrorism in Colombia" Colombia Report (15 April
2002), online: Colombia Journal Online <www.colombiajournal.org/colombial09.htm>.
8 5 Executive Order No. 13224 of September 23, 2001: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions
With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (2001).
86 George W. Bush, "President Freezes Terrorists' Assets" (24 September 2001), online:
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html>.
87 See Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, SC Res. 1373, UN
SCOR, 56th Sess., UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) at 2.
8 8 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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a lack of understanding at the highest levels of international law and
foreign relations that the practice of terrorism is not restricted to actions
by fanatical Muslims or desperate third-world groups against western
civilization. The current discourse on legal regulation of international
terrorism is conducted on the misleading template that only the usual
suspects-Iran, Iraq, PLO, Hamas, Syria, Sudan, Cuba, Al-Qaeda-are the
practitioners of international terror.90 The West also practises state-
sponsored terrorism, perhaps to a greater extent than both Al-Qaeda and
allied groups.
Apart from responding to the concerns of the West rather than
those of the Third World, international law and many scholars have a
propensity to dilute international norms to serve the interests of the West.
An important issue that arises in this context is the Nicaragua case
jurisprudence regarding state responsibility for terrorist acts of proxy
armies. In the Nicaragua case, the Court held that in a strict application of
the norms of state responsibility, the U.S. government did not have direct
responsibility for the terrorist acts of the Contras. This was based on the
fact that, leaving aside U.S. strategic support and financing, the United
States did not exercise direction and control over the activities of the
Contras. In the words of the Court, the Contra rebels were not de facto
agents of the United States because their
participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training,
supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of ... targets, and the planning of the
whole of its operation, is still insufficient in itself ... for the purpose of attributing to the
United States the acts committed by the Contras .... For this conduct to give rise to legal
responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged
violations were committed.91
Thus, the Nicaragua case reinforced a rigid and traditional rule in
international law that the conduct of private persons or entities is not
attributable to the state unless of course, the actor is a formal or de facto
agent of the state.92 The traditional rule was softened by the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
90 Hale E. Sheppard, "U.S. Actions to Freeze Assets of Terrorism: Manifest and Latent
Implications for Latin America" (2002) 17 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 625.
91 Supra note 62 at 115.
9 2 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR,
56th Sess., UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001); Responsibility of States for Internationally WrongfulActs, GA Res.
56/83, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (2001) 3; Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed. (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1996) at 502-03.
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(ICTY) in Prosecutor v. Tadic.9 3 The Appeals Chamber held that the lower
court's reliance on the ICJ's "effective control" test was contrary to the very
logic of state responsibility and inconsistent with state and judicial practice.
In place of the "effective control" test, the Chamber substituted an "overall
control" test. The ICTY concluded that for it to attribute to the state
responsibility for any unlawful acts, states need only exercise "overall
control" over private armed groups. However, since 9/11, international law
on state responsibility has abandoned traditional jurisprudence on state
responsibility as it was articulated in the Nicaragua case and more softly in
the Tadic case.94
Various UN Resolutions have, however, imputed the defunct
Taliban regime with responsibility for the terrorist attacks launched by Al-
Qaeda. Yet, it is obvious that the Taliban neither controlled nor directed
the 9/11 attacks. Al-Qaeda did. Of course, it is an ally of the Taliban just as
the U.S. government was to the Contras in Nicaragua. As President George
W. Bush reminded the world, "the allies of terror are equally guilty of
murder and equally accountable to justice."95 It may be argued that
responsibility may be imputed to the Taliban on the basis that having
learned of the role of Al-Qaeda in the 9/11 attack, and having harboured
and supported Al-Qaeda, it had appropriated the terrorist activities of Al-
Qaeda as its own.
Judicial support for this line of argument may be found in United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Iran v. US)96 where the
student takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran was held not to be an
official act of the government of Iran. However, after the takeover and
when Ayatollah Khomeini expressed his approval of the occupation of the
U.S. embassy, the acts of the students were imputed to the Iranian
government. The entire legal foundation of Operation Enduring Freedom
is premised on this new but fundamentally expansive narrative of
international law on state responsibility.97 As Derek Jinks observes, "this
expansion of liability was achieved not by refashioning any 'primary rules'
93 (1999) Case No IT-94-1-A (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Appeals
Chamber) [Tadic case]..
Jonathan Charney, "The Use of Force Against Terrorism and International Law" (2001) 95
A.J.I.L. 835.
Office of the Press Secretary, "President Bush Speaks to United Nations: Remarks by the
President to United Nations General Assembly" (10 November 2001), online: The White House
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html>.
96 (24 May 1980), I.C.J. Pleadings 3.
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defining the content of state obligations, but rather by relaxing the
'secondary rules' defining state responsibility for breaches of any such
obligation.
98
In international law, primary rules define the legal obligations while
secondary rules of state responsibility define the general conditions under
which state are to be considered responsible for internationally wrongful
acts or omissions. This distinction can be problematic in practice. As the
International Law Commission has observed, "it is one thing to define a
rule and the content of the obligation it imposes, and another to determine
whether that obligation has been violated and what should be the
consequences of the violation." 99
As suggested above, this distinction makes it easier for powerful
states to substantially rewrite international rules unilaterally without
apparently seeming to do so. It is remarkable that the United Nations, 1°°
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),"0 ' and the Organization of
American States (OAS) all endorsed the U.S. approach. In sharp contrast,
when terrorists bombed civilians in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the
Security Council did not attribute the attacks to any state. Neither did it
authorize the use of force as is implied in its resolutions on the
Taliban/Afghanistan case. Obviously, what is sauce for the goose is not
sauce for the gander. Sustained reflection on this point also confirms the
view that the response to A1-Qaeda marks a subtle but significant shift from
the doctrine of "effective control" of terrorists to "harbouring" of terrorists
as the threshold for attributing responsibility to states for terrorist acts
committed by terrorists operating from their jurisdictions.
The new "harbouring" rule represents a significant relaxation of the
traditional attribution regime. The new rule has a huge capacity to recast
private actions as state action. Apart from producing a remarkable number
of dubious "allies" (since the bombardment of the Taliban, there is no state
in the world that overtly claims to be anything but an "ally" to the United
States),1"2 weak states with porous borders are unfairly exposed to
American recriminations, cruise missiles, and bombs. No fair-minded
98 Ibid. at 83.
99International Law Commission, "Report of the Commission to the General Assembly," 2
YearbookoflnternationalLaw Commission, UN Doc. No. A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add. 1(1970) 271 at 306.
100 See Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, supra note 87.
101 Speech delivered by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson (2 October 2001), online: Nato
Official Homepage <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/sOl002a.htm>.
102 Greg Tavalio & John Altenburg, "State Responsibility for Sponsorship of Terrorist and
Insurgent Groups: Terrorism, State Responsibility, and the Use of Military Force" (2003) 4 Chicago
J. Int'l L. 97.
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person would dispute the fact that the old regime was a fiction" 3 and that
the new regime has its own merits but the point here is that we must
recognize the signal shift that has taken place in international law on state
responsibility. The attacks of 9/11 and the shift in our application of
international law underscores the privileged status of certain states in the
use of international law for the articulation and resolution of pressing
problems.
Similar changes in human rights law and the law of war are
apparent to the careful observer. Since 9/11, various western governments
have enacted a variety of legislation to "secure" their states. In the process,
many guaranteed freedoms have been significantly qualified. The
phenomenon hearkens back to Roman tyrants who justified their tyranny
through the maxim, saluspopulis est suprema lex (the safety of the republic
is the supreme law). Needless to say, this Napoleonic conception of law and
state security (it was Napoleon who once said that "he who saves the nation
does not break any law") has almost always been a ready excuse for tyranny
and totalitarianism.0 4 The feeling of moral rectitude, uncritical belief in a
higher good of national security, and teary-eyed embrace of nationalism
and national flags served as the basis for human rights violations by various
regimes throughout Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Today, that same
sense of moral certainty, fanatical belief in "national security" or
"homeland security," and ultra-nationalism lies at the root of current
assaults on human rights and international law by many western
democracies. Similarly, the war on terror has raised issues regarding the
capture, detention, and treatment of prisoners of war in the Afghan
conflict.' 5 As the Taliban fighters and other detainees in the war on
terrorism await their fate, significant questions about the legality of the
treatment of the Taliban fighters remain to be resolved.
10 6
Since 9/11, there has been a clamour to change and rethink
103 See for example, Marie Ann Slaughter & William Burke-White, "An International
Constitutional Moment" (2002) 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1 (arguing that the traditional "effective control" test
for attributing an act to a state is insufficient to address the threats posed by global criminals and the
states that harbor them).
104 Roseann Latore, "Coming Out of the Dark: Achieving Justice for Victims of Human Rights
Violations by South American Military Regimes" (2002) 25 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 419.
1 05 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N. T.S. 135 (1950).
106 For an examination of how Afghan mujahedin captured by the defunct Soviet Union were
treated see, Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Soviet Prisoners in the Afghan Conflict" (1984) 23 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 497.
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international law and its doctrines on the use of force.'1 7 Some scholars
have in the heat of the moment called for pre-emptive strikes against
terrorists.108 While conceding that such steps may amount to an abuse of
the right to use of force, the hysteria surrounding the war on terrorism
hardly affords room for sober consideration of the manifold ways in which
such radical reconfiguration of established rules would impact global
security. °9 The impact of 9/11 on international law has been enormous.
Without question, the events of 9/11 have been used to remake the world;
the question is whether our world is being remade in the way and form that
we want.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the terrible attacks of 9/11, there is increasing evidence of the
global reach and grasp of AI-Qaeda and its affiliates. The panic and
hysteria surrounding the war on terrorism has been remarkable. In this war,
it would seem that law has become the first casualty. Yet, lawlessness
hampers the war on terror. ° Recalling how similar lawlessness and
hypocrisy hampered the Isreali war on Palestinian terrorism, Robert Fisk
writes:
[I] remember the revolting prison of Khiam where Israel locked up its Lebanese
adversaries-real and presumed, none tried by a court-and where prisoners were brought,
shackled, hooded, sedated, for questioning. Their interrogation included electric
torture-electrified metal attached to a penis and nipples (there were women prisoners,
too)-which could never happen at Guantanamo Bay, as America's Israeli allies taught their
Lebanese militiamen in 1980. They in turn taught it to their Lebanese Shia militia enemies
who use electricity on their captives. America, Israel's friend, could have closed down this
sick, disgusting prison if it had insisted. But Washington remained silent ... the nation that
would later declare a war of good against evil didn't see much wrong at Khiam.""
1
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on Terrorism" (2002) 34 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 1.
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<http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol14/No2/art1.pdf>.
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Nicaragua" (2003) 14:5 E.J.I.L. 867, online: <http://www.ejil.org/journalVoll4/No5/140867.pdf>.
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Lawlessness, including torture, 12 cannot be the price to pay for the
war on terrorism. As American intelligence agents torture terrorist suspects
or send terrorist suspects to countries where it is obvious that they will be
tortured,'13 the consequences of this on international law must not be
overlooked. As Lee Dembart has pointed out, "if Americans want the
protections of the Geneva conventions in the future, they must recognize
and apply those protections now."
'' 14
Similarly, a trigger-happy attitude is hardly useful to the war on
terror. As it has now become apparent, the invasion of Iraq has not served
its intended purpose. According to Steve Coll,
the invasion of Iraq is an avaricious, premeditated unprovoked war against a foe who posed
no immediate threat. There is nothing that bin Laden could have hoped for more than the
American invasion and occupation of Iraq. We have waged two failed half-wars and, in doing
so, left Afghanistan and Iraq seething with anti-US sentiment, fertile grounds for the
expansion of A-Qaeda and kindred groups.
1 5
The first prognosis is that the recentering of global terrorism as a
peculiarly American problem has induced America to overreach itself. This
imperial overreach, a potentially fatal characteristic of most empires of the
past, holds significant challenges for global stability. The overbearing
approach to America's role in the world adopted by the Bush
administration along with its excessive reliance upon military might and
its enemies is based upon its recognition that it is fighting for values worthy of defense. The rule of law
is one of those values." Almandi v. Minster of Defence, online: <http://62.90.71.124/
eng/verdict/SearchENG/verdict bycase rslt.asp?casenbrhtml=HCJ+3451%2F02> cited in
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self-righteousness portend grave dangers for global security.1 6 As Regis
DeBray observes,
the United States compensates for its shortsightedness and its tendency to improvise, with
an altogether biblical self-assurance in its transcendent destiny. Puritan America is hostage
to a sacred morality; it regards itself as the predestined repository of Good. With a mission
to strike down Evil, Trusting in Providence, it pursues a politics that is at bottom as
theological and as old as Pope Gregory VIII. 7
Second, global terrorism cannot be eradicated solely by military
might, cynical manipulation of international law, and righteous indignation.
Unless powerful states drain the swamp of injustice in which the fanatical
mosquitoes of terrorism breed, and unless global poverty and desperation
are contained, those who wage war on terrorism labour in vain. Religious
exhortations and name-calling will not win the war on terror. There is no
genetic code for terrorism. While it is now morally fashionable to condemn
the militant wings of the Palestinian struggle as terrorists, it is only fair to
remember that pre-state Israel was hammered out on the anvil of activities
that are qualitatively similar to current Palestinian terrorism. While states
respond forcefully to terrorists, they would do well to examine the
grievances of the terrorists.
The hypocrisy of powerful states on the issue of terror leaves so
much to be desired. As Noam Chomsky recalls,
the New York Times called upon an expert on terrorism to offer his thoughts on how to
counter the plague. His advice, based upon long experience, was straightforward: 'the
terrorists, and especially their commanders, must be eliminated. He gave three examples of
successful counterterrorist actions: the US bombing of Libya, the Israeli bombing of Tunis,
and Israel's invasion of Lebanon. ... [The name of the expert] is Ariel Sharon. His terrorist
career, dating back to the early 1950s, includes the slaughter of 69 villagers in Qibya and 20
at the al-Bureig refugee camp in 1953; terrorist operations in the Gaza region and north-
eastern Sinai in the early 1970s including the expulsion of some ten thousand farmers into
the desert, their homes bulldozed and farmlands destroyed in preparation for Jewish
settlement; the invasion of Lebanon ... ; the subsequent massacre at Sabra and Shatilla; and
others. Some might feel that the choice of Ariel Sharon to provide the "civilized world" with
lessons on how to "stop the slaughter of innocents" may be a little odd, perhaps perverse,
possibly even hypocritical. ... In a moral and intellectual climate such as this, it may well be
appropriate for the world's greatest newspaper to select Ariel Sharon as our tutor on the
evils of terrorism and how to combat it."8
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In sum, the martial and lawless response to international terrorism
is doomed to failure if there is no coherent concept of terrorism. It is
probable that the sheer psychology of power makes it increasingly likely
that the United States will continue to pursue terrorism in a near paranoid
way. International terrorism is complex, shifting, and often elusive. No
state, no matter how powerful, can fight terror alone." 9 As Americans and
America demand blood in a post-9/11 world, the problem is not whether
America has the means to maintain its strong military might or the will to
use it. The real question is whether it has the moral capacity to fight and
defeat terror. States that purport to be at war with terror would do well to
wean themselves from excessive reliance on brute force and disregard for
the rule of law. 2'
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March 2003) A17.
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